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“virtuouS beingS”: the concept oF tha 
damtshig, And being A morAL perSon in 
contemporAry bhutAneSe Society
This paper sets out a preliminary investigation of tha damtshig. In particular, it examines 
the concept of tha damtshig, and its role in the creation of a sense of moral identity among 
contemporary Bhutanese. The concept of tha damtshig is central to Bhutanese social 
values and based on Buddhist teachings. However, more recently the concept has become 
intertwined with notions of loyalty to the state and political allegiance. By focusing on 
how the concept of tha damtshig is created and embodied in everyday life, and in its use to 
create and maintain a moral sense of personhood, we can discern the interplay between 
popular, ground-level understandings and perspectives and state policies as Bhutan seeks 
to balance social and political transformation with maintaining its traditional values.
introdUction
Ngawang scowled and exclaimed “they have 
no tha damtshig” as he described an attack on a 
small remote temple in central Bhutan. From the 
beginning of my fieldwork I encountered the term 
tha damtshig that left me floundering. Typically, I 
would smile—uncertain of what was being referred 
to or its significance. Gradually, the importance of 
tha damtshig and its meaning for lay Bhutanese began 
to emerge. I soon realised that my pre-field work 
readings on Bhutan and the wider Himalayan region 
had not prepared me for this concept and over the 
following two years, I found myself returning to it 
time and time again. Tha damtshig literally means 
“the highest promise” or “ultimate vow” from the 
word damtshig referring to the Buddhist vows 
(samaya). More precisely, the term damtshig refers 
to vows taken as part of a tantric commitment, or 
as a “pledge which ought not to be transgressed” 
(Phuntsho 2004:569).1 Yet, sitting in the kitchen 
of Sengge’s house with his nephew Ngawang and 
his friends, the term did not refer to monastic or 
tantric vows.2 More recently, a Bhutanese friend 
1. See Dudjom Rinpoche 1996 for further details on tantric 
vows.
2. I have used pseudonyms throughout the paper. Sengge is 
a tailor and former monk from Lhuntse. Aged in his 60s, he and 
his wife Palden, shared their small two room house with their 
nephew Ngawang and daughter, Chotsho. It was one of the first 
Bhutanese homes I entered and over the course of fieldwork it 
became my “home”. 
and colleague wrote, “it may also be noted that tha 
damtshig is used more frequently in Bhutan than in 
other Himalayan countries and done so mostly in a 
social context” (ibid: 570). 
My paper sets out a preliminary investigation of 
tha damtshig. In particular, I examine the concept of 
tha damtshig, and its role in the creation of a sense 
of moral identity among contemporary Bhutanese. 
The concept of tha damtshig is, in my opinion, 
central to Bhutanese social values. Sonam Kinga 
describes it as a “commitment and obligation of love, 
honour and loyalty in one’s relationship with other 
people”(2001:156). The social values of tha damtshig 
are based on Buddhist teachings, yet more recently 
have become intertwined with notions of loyalty to 
the state and political allegiance (Phuntsho 2004). 
The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Bhutanese 
is counterpoised by an underlying unity—the 
lives they lead, the social encounters and realities 
they experience as well as the selves they imagine 
and seek to project all “reflect or refract pervasive 
religious and moral values” (Parrish 1994:4). 3
Accordingly, my paper describes and examines 
the “pervasive religious and moral values” that 
3. My focus is on the northern Bhutanese, rather than the 
Lhotshampa, Bhutanese of Nepalese descent who are primarily 
Hindu. The northern Bhutanese cover two of the largest minority 
groups— the Ngalong and the Sharchop, as well as the smaller 
linguistic/ethnic groups who are predominately Buddhist. See 
Pommaret 1997a for more information on the “ethnic mosaic” of 
Bhutan. 
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the National Assembly re-affirmed the importance of driglam 
namzha. Kuensel noted that:
the house agreed that a mere rule would not help 
in preserving and promoting traditional etiquette 
(Drig-lam –namzha). It should come from within 
people [They] must be made aware of its advantages 
and the harmony it can create in any relation[ship?] 
and to society as a whole. (Kuensel 3 January 2009). 
Following the 1989 edict, driglam namzha assumed a 
political significance as it became associated with what 
was viewed as the promotion of the cultural practices of 
the northern Bhutanese over their southern neighbors, the 
Lhotshampa (Hutt 2003).7 Whilst for northern Bhutanese, 
driglam namzha “came to be viewed more and more as the 
formal and structured display of official etiquette rather 
than as the fluid and spontaneous practice of good manners” 
(Phuntsho 2004). More specifically, driglam namzha has 
come to symbolise Bhutanese traditional values and cultural 
identity. 
trAdition And morAlity
Throughout my discussions with Bhutanese on tha 
damtshig were frequent references to “tradition” and morality. 
Before turning to consider tha damtshig, it is important to 
reflect on the meanings implied by these terms. The claim 
“It’s tradition!” can suggest a temporal framework that lacks 
a clear beginning and marks off the historical period from 
“modernity”. In effect, the past and present are distanced, 
if not, actually separated. This approach is deeply flawed. It 
suggests a rupture between past and present, whilst assuming 
that the contemporary or the modern are the products of 
such a rupture. A second approach to tradition emphasises 
it as strongly normative (Shils, 1981). For Shils, tradition is 
“far more than the statistically frequent reoccurrence over 
a succession of generations of similar beliefs, practices, 
institutions and works”(1981:24). Rather, tradition “is [the] 
normative transmission which links the generations of 
the dead with the generations of the living” (1981:24). So, 
tradition is not left behind in the transition to modernity, 
instead tradition is what modernity requires to prevent society 
falling apart. This second approach to tradition is reflected in 
the various representations and invocations of tradition made 
by Bhutanese scholars and lay people alike, as they discuss 
the process of social transformation in Bhutan (cf. Ura 1994, 
1995, 1997; RGOB 1999a). 
Hobsbawm in his well-known and oft cited introduction 
to The Invention of Tradition (1984), distinguishes between 
“invented tradition” and “custom”. He identifies “invented 
tradition” with super-structural institutions and elites 
whilst he conceives “custom” to be popular and capable of 
7. I do not examine the conflict between the Royal Government 
and the Lhotshampa in this paper. For more information see Hutt 2003, 
Phuntsho 2006.
pervade and shape Bhutanese society and their significance 
for providing a moral framework and vocabulary which 
permeates everyday life. By focusing on how the concept of 
tha damtshig is created and embodied in everyday life, and in 
its use to create and maintain a moral sense of personhood, 
we can discern the interplay between popular, ground-
level understandings and perspectives and state policies as 
Bhutan seeks to balance social and political transformation 
with maintaining its traditional values. This everyday 
understanding and practice is therefore an ever-evolving 
process as a result of both an internal and external dialogue. 
driglam namzha: a brief note
As I discuss tha damtshig I refer on occasion to driglam 
namzha. 4 For many Bhutanese, driglam namzha refers to the 
code of conduct and manner of deportment introduced by 
the seventeenth century founder of Bhutan, the Zhabdrung, 
Ngawang Namgyal. A publication by the National Library of 
Bhutan states that the Zhabdrung “promulgated the ‘Chayig 
Chhenmo’ (Great Law Code) containing specific instructions, 
which are inscribed on slate at the entrance to Punakha 
Dzong.” (1999:xxxvii). Although the National Library text and 
other recent works (Dasho Khadro 1997; Royal Chamberlain 
1999), on driglam namzha present it as being applied to all 
Bhutanese, my own reading is that it was primarily directed 
at the state clergy and government officials of the Drukpa 
government established by the Zhabdrung.5 Over time, the 
practices of driglam namzha were either applied to or adopted 
by ordinary Bhutanese.6 Unlike the concept of tha damtshig, 
driglam namzha is not “bound by a religious context” (Phuntsho 
2004:572). The code of conduct or etiquette regulates the 
form of appropriate dress to be worn by Bhutanese when 
visiting various public or government buildings, the form of 
greeting and how to conduct specific forms of ceremonies that 
mark the beginning and end of public events. In 1989 a royal 
edict re-emphasised the importance of driglam namzha as a 
key feature of Bhutanese cultural identity. In January 2009 
4. Driglam namzha (Tib./Dz: sgrigs lam rnam gzhag) is not examined 
in this paper since the focus is on tha damtshig. A separate paper on driglam 
namzha is currently in progress. 
5. Phuntsho suggests that “The Zhabdrung and his immediate 
circle perhaps can be rightly credited with the earliest implementation of 
driglam as a formal practice at an institutional level” (2004:573). He rightly 
points out that “driglam, in the form of loose and informal adoption of 
proper behaviour and manner, existed even before the Zhabdrung and his 
establishment of organised institutions” (ibid).
6. I argue that driglam namzha was initially applied to government 
officials based on an eighteenth century law text that admonishes 
government officials about how to behave towards the people. More 
specifically, it is a very refined form of social etiquette that on the day to 
day level of village life would not be required. Rather, my informants talked 
about bey zha (sb/’bad bzhag), an everyday form of manners that embodied 
respect and consideration towards family and neighbors without either the 
formal or hierarchical aspects of driglam namzha.
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being mobilised at society’s base. He presents tradition as 
imposing fixed practices and custom as flexible and capable 
of accommodating a certain amount of innovation, while still 
providing the sanction of “precedent, social continuity and 
natural law” (1984:). As Vlastos (1998) points out there are 
limits to the utility of Hobsbawm’s approach. First, is the 
frequent criticism that all traditions are socially constructed, 
and therefore in some sense invented. Second is the 
unresolved dichotomy Hobsbawm creates between tradition 
and custom. There is a disjunction between the rhetorical 
aspect of tradition represented in the claim to invariance, 
and the continually shifting subjective aspect, which is 
institutionalised in practices and texts, which are reorganised 
and reformulated over brief periods of time without apparent 
loss of authority. Hobsbawm’s emphasis on the elite/popular 
dichotomy stresses the role of the elite in the formulation of 
tradition. However, as Vlastos notes “Traditions, like customs, 
are embedded in larger social structures that are constantly 
reshaped by the forces of change . . . they aim to arrest” 
(1998:4). Therefore we need to recognise that they are not 
static, nor are they exclusively top-down. 
It is therefore crucial to stress the “social and historical 
roles and statuses” of my Bhutanese informants who embody 
what are described as traditional values, for these are central 
elements to the narratives they produce. Their lives, and 
therefore the narratives they use to explain their daily lives, 
are deeply and firmly located within the wider narratives of 
their communities, from which they derive their sense of being 
Bhutanese. According to Alistair MacIntyre, each person is a 
“bearer of a tradition” (1981: 221). These traditional practices 
or values provide each individual with a moral identity, a base 
point from which he or she is able to develop their own moral 
particularity. 
This leads to the next element—the role of morality. What 
do I mean by being a “moral” person? Based on the material 
presented, I have chosen to delineate the term “moral” to refer 
to notions of good and bad, of appropriate and inappropriate 
conduct, of respect and humility versus disrespectful actions. 
notions of civic responsibility and more recently loyalty to the 
nation-state. Kaviraj comments that “concepts are implicit in 
social practices” and “though not always verbalized, either in 
everyday or intellectual forms, these ideas are nevertheless 
social concepts” (1997:83). The concept of tha damtshig is 
part of the daily repetitiveness of everyday life, when people 
are engaged “in their everyday interpretation of the world – 
to describe what they see and evaluate what they approve 
or deplore” (Kaviraj 1997:83). In essence, I am seeking to 
delineate notions of “moral sense”, as reflected and embedded 
in the practices, social interactions and narratives of the 
Bhutanese. 
The emphasis on the performative aspect of morality is 
crucial. Rather than treating morality and moral states as 
restricted to highly marked decisive events, it is important 
to focus our attention on the practical routines of everyday 
life. Ideas of morality are intertwined in the personal choices 
and actions engaged in on an individual level during the 
course of everyday life. A sense of the moral, or rather the 
virtuous, can be found in the continuous acts engaged in 
by people. However, whilst the communicative aspect of 
action and practice encompasses the moral domain, two 
other significant factors require to be considered: personal 
agency, on the one hand, and on the other, moral reasoning. 
Without wishing to become side-tracked by a discussion of 
ideas of moral philosophy, both of these factors form part 
of the weaving together of a personal sense of virtue and of 
moral conduct. 
In addition, although I have used the singular “morality”, 
I should be speaking of “moralities” (Howell 1997; Parrish 
1994). This better recognises the diversity of moralities 
expressed by individuals. More importantly, as I have 
come to think about the connection between morality 
and law, it is important not to see morality as a coherent 
imposed system. Therefore, rather than treating morality 
as an unequivocal code, it is more relevant and fruitful to 
treat morality as the “form and acts by which commitments 
are engaged and virtue accomplished” (Lambek 2000:316). 
Central to this paper are the strong links between morality 
and practice as understood by the Bhutanese and outlined 
in the following section. However, I do not want to reduce 
morality and its practice to mere actions. Whilst I argue that 
morality is a learned practice, one embodied by the actor 
or agent, it is not reduced to mere habit. Indeed, morality 
requires personal agency and moral reasoning, for these are 
the basis from which people choose to act in a particular 
way—virtuously or non-virtuously. As MacIntyre notes “the 
exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of the 
[good] life, not merely a preparatory exercise to secure such 
a life” (1981:149). The relationship between moral values, 
of moralities in the plural, and practices is a dynamic one: 
“Values are continuously changing and adapting through 
actual choices and practices, while, at the same time, they 
continue to inform and shape choices and practices” (Howell 
1997:4). As Karma Phuntsho notes these values can become 
secularised and, in his view, distorted, as they are associated 
with political loyalty and submission to the ruling power of 
the government (2004).
‘Dul wa And TsHulkHrims: morAl 
diScipline And SociAl hArmony
From a Bhutanese perspective the concept of  tha damtshig 
seeks not only to promote social harmony, it seeks to establish 
and maintain social justice. This perspective is reminiscent 
of the concept of wa, the spirit of peace and harmony in 
Japan (Kimio 1998:300) and li or “principle” in the sense of 
underlying “source of natural order” in China (Perenboom 
1993:47). In this section, I examine Buddhist philosophy, 
which I separate into two categories, doctrine and discipline, 
and the principle doctrinal features which shape tha damtshig. 
Underlying  tha damtshig are Buddhist teachings on moral 
discipline (Tib/Dz: tshul khrims) and karma (Tib/Dz: las). 
